Growing global interconnection and interdependency of computer networks, in combination with increased sophistication of cyber attacks over time, demonstrate the need for better understanding of the collective and cooperative security measures needed to prevent and respond to cybersecurity emergencies. The Exploring Cyber International Relations (ECIR) Data Dashboard project is an initial effort to gather and analyze such data within and between countries. This report describes the prototype ECIR Data Dashboard and the initial data sources used.
Introduction
The development of the modern economy, and of sophisticated information technology in particular, has led to an increasing global interconnectivity and interdependence. Such interconnectivity deeply benefits commerce and communication, but collectivizes vulnerabilities and security problems to a state the international community has not before had to address. The development of collective and collaborative cybersecurity has been formally underway for more than twenty years, and much progress has been made. Nonetheless, there remain many opportunities to further develop collaborative and decentralized collective cybersecurity networks and procedures.
The purpose of this report is twofold: first, the report explores and summarizes the state of collaboration and information availability from the oldest and most-developed formal institutions of collaborative cybersecurity: the Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and identifies potential shortcomings and areas for development. Second, we introduce the reader to the Data Dashboard project, conducted under the auspices of the Exploring Cyber International Relations (ECIR) team at MIT and Harvard. The Dashboard will function as a simple, easy-to-use source on global and nation-level data, with specific emphasis on cybersecurity and threat data, as well as on related current events. The Dashboard is designed to help researchers, policymakers, IT professionals, and other stakeholders to track potentially critical trends in relevant cybersecurity data, including attacks, threats, vulnerabilities, and defenses, etc. Increasing stakeholder access to summary and analytical data should significantly increase the efficacy of cybersecurity efforts at all levels, including individual and institutional defense, corporate and national policymaking, and high-level coordination and cooperation.
Well-known collectors of relevant nation-level cybersecurity data are the Computer Emergency Response Teams, or CERTs. The largest CERTs typically operate at a national level as quasigovernmental entities (that is, a country has its own CERT), but have a mandate to coordinate extensively with other CERTs within the country and in other countries, often under the auspices of the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) operated by Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). While highly diverse, and often in infancy, these CERTs have the potential to not only provide critical cybersecurity data to all stakeholders, but also to coordinate responses to cyber attacks or to other cyber emergencies. A brief history, summary, and analysis of national-level CERT activities and their publicly available data are discussed below.
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)

History and Purpose of CERTs
The first CERT, at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), was launched in 1988 with funding from DARPA, as a response to the Morris Worm attack (which took down perhaps 10% of the Internet during November, 1988) . The CERT mandate is now to develop and promote best management practices and technology applications to "resist attacks on networked systems, to limit damage, and to ensure continuity of critical services." 1 The CMU CERT, during the 1990s, began to help other countries develop their own CERTs and maintains to this day a formal Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) development program 2 , including for the United States. The CERT at CMU is now officially known as the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), as many other response teams have chosen the name CERT (where others have chosen CSIRT). The Coordination Center works closely with US-CERT, the latter of which is an indirect branch of the Department of Homeland Security. It uses a largely decentralized approach to prevention of security failures (in education and training, helping create local CERTS, publishing information, etc), but is ready to lead a coordinated response with US-CERT and other local CERTs in order to stamp out major security failures or major threats.
CERT/CC works in the following fields; these fields provide a guideline for the work of other national CERTs and CSIRTs around the world:
Software Awareness: Searches for, receives, analyzes, and reports major software security vulnerabilities and malicious code. Publishes advice on responses to vulnerabilities and threats, helping to create software more secure to attack.
Secure Systems: Engineering of networks that have high situational awareness and high response speed to deal with coordinated attacks. Goal is to create networks that can survive attack and continue functioning.
Organizational Security: Encourages and helps develop implementation of proper security management and software in individual organizations. Advocates government policy that increases security of national, corporate, and private systems.
Coordinated Response: Helps create and train response teams for different organizations, governments, and companies, including the Department of Homeland Security (US-CERT), and the National Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) of Qatar. Thanks largely to this training, the United States has dozens of smaller CSIRTs (that belong to enterprises or industry organizations) that work together to deal with high-risk threats, and to perform forensics on past security breaches.
Education and Training: Provides public training seminars, certification training/testing, as well as collegiate degrees at CMU.
The interconnected nature of modern computer networking assures that major failures in the security of a single institution have the potential to create larger damage to other institutions, or even large portions of the Internet. To solve the collective action problem, CERTs were designed with decentralization and coordination in mind. Ideally, the national CERTs would overlook an array of CERTs at various levels below. CERTs within a single company or institution, in a sector, etc, would work with each other under the auspices of the national CERT in order to offer both robust prevention and monitoring capability and a decentralized, distributed response to emergencies and attacks that may arise. This ideal configuration would lead to an efficient coordination between organizations ranging from semi-government to non-profit to private/corporate to ensure both collective and individual security. As can be seen from Figure 1 .1, the national CERT is intended to coordinate the activities of the other internal CERTS, such as those of individual enterprises, of industry organizations, and NGO/semigovernmental organizational CERTs for different sectors of the economy. Vendor CERTs would be responsible for ensuring that state-of-the-art security is embedded in software, to prevent the spread of vulnerabilities. Commercial and internal CERTs would work together to disseminate best security practices to large enterprises. National and sector CERTs would collect and organize cybersecurity information, and coordinate active responses to major cyberseucrity threats or breaches.
Current Status and Breadth
In reality, the CERT security structure remains in its infancy in most countries that do have national CERTs, and the ideal CERT network (as explained above) is not even fully developed in the CERT's origin nation, the United States. Many countries do not have CERTs, but significant progress has been made over the past two decades in increasing the population of national CERTs and other CERT institutions in many countries with a large Internet user population or Internet-centric economy. While there is no authoritative centralized list of national CERT programs, the following list of 54 countries provides those that the authors have found. There are certainly other countries with some sort of cybersecurity teams, but these CERTs are more specifically national-level, cooperative, educating, and responsive organizations.
Countries with National CERTs Most large enterprises have dedicated IT security teams, some of which are called CSIRTs or even CERTs (but many of which are not).
5 These cybersecurity teams are often the targets of solicited surveys for collecting incident information and are the points of contact for dissemination of best practices and threat alerts.
General Data Availability from CERTs
4 From http://www.first.org/about/organization/teams/ and http://www.apcert.org/about/structure/members.html 5 Some examples can be seen here: http://www.first.org/about/organization/teams/ Many of the national CERTs collect information on a number of cybersecurity issues in their countries by year, quarter, or month. Information collection, in general, is conducted by surveys: organizations voluntarily (although often by solicitation) disclose attack types (placed on the organization) and defenses and shortcomings within the organization, etc. In addition, some CERTs have performed data collection through passive probes in their national networks. CERTs often aggregate these data to present nationwide reports on the state of cybersecurity during the reporting period, and trends over time. Some CERTs also ask institutions about their defenses and security technology, as well as request self-criticisms by institutions of their security readiness for different kinds of attacks, and policies, standards, etc, used by different institutions. The aggregated survey method has some interesting methodological artifacts that are worth noting. They are best described by two examples: if a single virus hits 1000 institutions (and they all report), then the virus is counted 1000 times. If 100 viruses hit a single enterprise, an "incident" reporting method will lead to 100 hits, where a "respondents" method will report only one hit (as a "respondents" method simply asks whether the respondent has experienced that specific problem in the reporting period.)
An example graph from US-CERT is provided below and then briefly explained. While each CERT is usually consistent between reporting periods, data consistency between CERTs is limited. CERTs do not have a standardized typology of data: their surveys ask different questions and create different categories of attacks and vulnerabilities. CERTs lack a consistent data presentation method: some present data in absolute numbers of reports, others in percentages only. Term definition across CERTs is also sometimes inconsistent or unclear. Comparison and international aggregation are therefore often difficult, but there are a number of types of data that are commonly reported, in some form or another:
US-CERT provides the most comprehensive and detailed definition of terms, as explained: "A computer incident within US-CERT is, as defined by NIST Special Publication 800-61, a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer security practices."
There are six categories regarding computer incidents used by US-CERT.
CAT 1 --Unauthorized Access: In this category an individual gains logical or physical access without permission to a federal agency network, system, application, data, or other resources.
Other reports by US-CERT further elaborate on this definition: "Unauthorized Access is when a person who does not have permission to connect to or use a system gains entry in a manner unintended by the system owner…The specifics are different for each individual event but it could happen in any number of ways. Usually access is gained via unpatched software or other known vulnerabilities." ("Unauthorized Access") "Unauthorized access" entails approaching, trespassing within, communicating with, storing data in, retrieving data from, or otherwise intercepting and changing computer resources without consent. These laws relate to either or both, or any other actions that interfere with computers, systems, programs or networks." ("Computer Hacking and Unauthorized Access Laws.") CAT 2 --Denial of Service (DoS): For example: Downloading files causes a significant amount of traffic over the network. This activity may reduce the availability of certain programs on your computer or may limit your access to the internet. "A 'denial-of-service' attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service. Examples include attempts to "flood" a network, thereby preventing legitimate network traffic, attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, thereby preventing access to a service, attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a service , attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person (…) Other types of attack may include a denial of service as a component, but the denial of service may be part of a larger attack. Illegitimate use of resources may also result in denial of service. For example, an intruder may use your anonymous ftp area as a place to store illegal copies of commercial software, consuming disk space and generating network traffic.
There are three basic types of DoS attack: 1) consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources 2) destruction or alteration of configuration information 3) physical destruction or alteration of network components"
CAT 3 --Malicious Code: Successful installation of malicious software (e.g., virus, worm, spyware, bot, Trojan horse, or other code-based malicious entity that infects or affects an operating system or application). The intent of such malicious code is often to take control of the computer or destroy or change information stored on the computer. Agencies are not required to report malicious logic that has been successfully quarantined by antivirus (AV) software.
CAT 4 --Improper Usage: Violation of acceptable usage policies (as established by the enterprise).
CAT 5 --Scans, Probes, or Attempted Access: any activity that seeks to access or identify a federal agency computer, open ports, protocols, service, or any combination for later exploit. This activity does not directly result in a compromise or denial of service.
CAT 6 --Investigation: Unconfirmed incidents of potentially malicious or anomalous activity deemed by the reporting entity to warrant further review.
These definitions are not shared universally by other CERTs, but certainly provide a relatively authoritative guide to what statistical data represents.
There are a few methodological concerns beyond incompatibilities that are worth noting. The survey style of information reporting on the part of CERTs means comparisons between nations with otherwise compatible data definitions and typology is difficult. Numerical comparisons can be misleading if the breadth of a survey is not explicitly clear-if both countries survey very different proportions of the population, then their absolute numerical data will be incomparable (though percentages may remain comparable). Additionally, even if survey respondents are relatively accurate, most respond on behalf of institutions-there may be disproportionate weights placed upon different institutions if response rates are significantly different. It is further unclear whether an incident at a large institution should be counted the same way as an incident at a smaller one.
Examples of Specific Data Provided by Some CERTs
Here we explore data available at select CERTs, including type of vulnerability/threat, frequency of publication, and other relevant information. A To illustrate the types of CERT data available, examples are provided below. These examples are provided largely to emphasize the diversity of data available at CERTs across the world (and, similarly, inter-CERT data inconsistency). The five national CERTs chosen below are the United States, China, India, Russia, and Estonia.
US-CERT
The United States national CERT is affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security, and is a distinctly different entity from CERT/CC at Carnegie Mellon University (which is an independent and academic entity). These two largest US CERTs share information and, in the case of a large-scale attack, will often coordinate extensively in leading a response.
Examples of information provided is shown in Figures 3.2, 3 .3, and 3.4. The charts and graph above suggest that the greatest threat by frequency to US institutions and users is some form of attempted information access, namely phishing. The vast majority of threats reported to US-CERT are related to attempts to deceive the user (phishing, malicious website, non-cyber) rather than direct attacks against the defenses of the computer or the network. Figure 3 .2 breaks down reported incidents by official US-CERT category; Figures 3.3 and 3.4 describe more specific attacks (each attack falling into one of the official categories). As can be seen, most "Scans, probes, and attempted access" attacks are phishing. Comparing the two graphs, we see that phishing (at 72% of all incidents) makes up the vast majority of attempted access attacks (at 77% of all incidents), suggesting that by far, most access attempts attack the user rather than the software or hardware directly. .5 describes different sub-categories of misuse of enterprise computing equipment, which can lead to any of the US-CERT categories of attacks. Above we observe a general decline in the most pervasive of misuses over the past 5 years, including viruses, insider abuse, mobile theft, unauthorized access, and denial of service attacks. Proportional increases are seen in a number of "misuses" occur in 2004, which suggests (although we have no confirmation of) their addition to the reporting and collecting mechanisms by US-CERT, rather than sudden onset of their use. Because the above statistics represent a percentage of all respondents (rather than a percentage of all incidents reported), the decline in largest misuses (including viruses, insider abuse, mobile theft, unauthorized access, etc) may be due to an actual reduction in the incident as a problem, suggesting that IT professionals and companies in the US may be responding well to the most prevalent security threats.
CN-CERT (China)
Examples of the China CERT (CN-CERT) national-level data is shown below. At least until 2006, we observe a dramatic (and perhaps exponential) growth in incidents. After 2006, due to the change in reporting structure of CN-CERT, the trend is difficult to follow. This growth in absolute number of incidents is likely at least as much due to an explosion in Internet users in China as it is due to an increase in vulnerabilities. Here we observe a dramatic proportional increase in botnets and spam as reported by CN-CERT. Such attacks typically represent organized for-profit ventures rather than purely destructive attacks, and usually target users, rather than technical defensive network capabilities. Denial of Service attacks actually decline from few to literally none in the first half of 2008, suggesting either a reporting bias or an increase in (already extensive) government cybersecurity defensive effectiveness.
leading to the significant drop in reports. Over the relatively short period in the above graphs, we observe a downward trend in website attacks in Mainland China, which may be due to increased sophistication in government control. Hong Kong and Taiwan also seem to show a gradual downward trend in attacks, though the trend is not as sharp as in the mainland. This graph suggests that most incidents reports are on the rise (which is to be expected), except for spamming, which appears to be slowly decreasing over time, suggesting potentially increased spamming defenses (like spamscreens) in deployment. It also suggests that malicious code and website compromise / malware propagation are the major forms of attack in India. It should be noted that this is quite different from the United States, where Phishing is the major reported attack. suggests an anomaly in reporting or recording, leading to the two (admittedly similar) concepts to be switched, though a simple coincidence is possible. Either way, by 2009, attacks on software infrastructure, rather than direct attacks on users, appear to dominate cybersecurity issues in India.
Russia CERT
We provide a few examples of data from Russia CERT below: The above graphs indicate that in Russia, user-centered attacks like malware and phishing are high proportions of reported incidents, much like the United States (and unlike India).
22 http://www.cert.ru/stat.html (originally in Russian) 23 http://www.cert.ru/conference2008.html Note: Best interpretation suggests that "Closed(+)" indicates an incident that was resolved to satisfaction; "Closed(-)" indicates an incident that was resolved unsatisfactorily; "Remain" indicates incidents that remain unresolved. The above graph shows a slightly different story in Estonia than the US or China. Computer viruses take up a much larger proportion of cybersecurity incidents-a larger proportion than even spamming. Reporting methodology may be to blame for this discrepancy: specifically, the survey refers to "security problems" for a particular user-many may not consider spamming a serious "security problem" even if they are spammed. Most users report having had no problems, which may suggest that most indeed had no major problems, or that standards for security in personal users are more lax. The above graphs reveal that the majority of enterprises in Estonia report that no serious problems have occurred, and that the trend seems to be relatively positive. This is somewhat surprising, given the widely reported spree of denial-of-service (DOS) attacks against websites in Estonia during April and May of 2007 27 , possibly this reporting does not capture all such events, especially against government web sites.
CERT Estonia
Furthermore, corporate enterprises seem to report an even lower proportion of security incidents than personal users, though it should be noted that the categories reported are significantly different, making the two results difficult to compare. Furthermore, the lack of differentiation between number of attacks on corporate enterprises leaves open the distinct possibility that certain enterprises are attacked often and deliberately, where others are not high-priority targets to attackers. We do not know if the 10-40% of attacked enterprises were attacked once or a hundred times. 
Summary
These examples illustrate a number of interesting key points, some of which will be discussed in more detail later. First, the nature of cybersecurity issues varies widely between different countries, in sometimes surprising ways. Estonia seems to have a surprisingly low number of incidents per enterprise capita, particularly given its history with Russia. The predominant type of threat in China and the United States is against the user directly-phishing, spamming, improper usage, and other attempts to trick the user into compromising his own security; in Russia and India, malware and malicious code attacks are more common, and there is no clear explanation as to why.
Second, reporting methods vary significantly between different CERTs. No two CERTs above reported information in the same way; variations in incident or threat definitions, in typology, in frequency and chronological scale, and in reporting methodology (some CERTs report by total number of reports, some by proportion of total incidents, some by proportion of respondents). These inconsistencies make cross-country comparisons (and, presumably, information coordination) challenging -though trends over time might be identifiable.
The ECIR Data Dashboard
Purpose
The ECIR Data Dashboard is developed to provide historical trend data as well as current statistics and news to policymakers, academics, IT professionals, and other stakeholders. By consulting the Dashboard, the user can compare trends in national-level Cybersecurity threats/vulnerabilities among several countries and/or regions, as well as compare these trends against other relevant national-level statistics to find patterns and correlations. To this extent, the Dashboard provides data in three categories: The Dashboard allows the user to select any number of countries and/or regions with which to compare data. While the default x-axis measurement is year (future versions will consider other time scales such as quarter, month), any data can be selected for the y-axis, allowing the user to compare correlations in multiple strands of data. Additionally, the Dashboard allows the user to divide any strand of data into another. This allows the user to compare the data in new ways. For example: dividing population into any measurement creates a "per capita" measurement. Also, the user can compare the viruses reported per number of Internet users. Future versions will further allow the user to compare the viruses reported per number of Internet users per capita, requiring two division functions. Additionally, the user can select to graph the data on a linear or logarithmic scale. The Dashboard thus provides the user with a great amount of flexibility and power in finding exactly what data to compare, how to compare it, and how to illustrate it, so that international cybersecurity can be deeply and robustly investigated.
Development
The Dashboard was developed in three primary parts: web user interface, database generation, and newsfeed. A regulated interface between the user interface front-end and the database back-end allow information flow from the back-end to the front to operate seamlessly and robustly though changes in code.
Web User Interface
The user interface is a Web application designed to query a database and create graphs of information on-the-fly. The user interface provides a number of fields from which the user can select the countries/regions of interest, the x-axis variable (i.e., start year and end year for the observation) and the y-axis variable (i.e., measurement data to observe) as well as graphing type (linear or logarithmic).
The "submit" button sends the request, after which the web application reads the requested data from the back-end database and draws the graph, automatically scaling the axes to reflect a "best fit" view of the data. Figure 4 .1, a number of countries are listed in the left side. In the selection list, the countries are grouped into corresponding regions. From the list, the user can select several countries and/or regions of interest 28 . By selecting the start year and the end year, the user can set the observation period. The Dashboard currently incorporates a chronological range of 2000 to 2008. In the right side of the page, the user can select one or two attributes (i.e., measurement data). In case of two attributes, the user should also select an operator by which the data of interest can be calculated from them. The current Dashboard provides only the Division operator by which Attribute 1 is divided by Attribute 2 can be observed. The user can also set the y-axis to a linear or logarithmic scale -which is particularly helpful when comparing data strands that different considerably in values, such as comparing large and small countries, as illustrated later. 
Database
The back-end database of the Dashboard is the Palo MOLAP database 29 . MOLAP stands for "Multidimensional On-Line Analytical Processing," which is an approach to quickly answer multidimensional analytical queries. The Palo database uses a multidimensional data model, allowing multidimensional structures to organize data and express the relationships between the data. These structures are broken into cubes; the cubes are able to store and access data within the confines of each cube. Each cell within a multidimensional structure contains aggregated data related to elements along each of its dimensions. The output of a MOLAP query is displayed in a matrix format in which the dimensions form the rows and columns, and the relevant measurements form the data values. By using MOLAP database, the Dashboard can quickly answer queries of any aggregated data, such as regional data. Palo consists of a mature MOLAP database server and an Excel add-in. Furthermore, JPalo provides a set of Java API to manipulate the Palo database 30 . These features make it an excellent choice as the back-end database of the Dashboard.
In the current stage, there exists one cube with three dimensions in the Palo MOLAP database. The three dimensions are " Countries", "Years" and "Attributes". When the country, year and attribute are determined, the corresponding measurement data can be accessed.
Recent Headlines
The Dashboard uses Chameleon to create a list of top-relevance recent news headlines. Cameleon is a web extraction engine developed by MIT to automatically extract any piece of data of interest from semi-structured documents (e.g., web pages). In the current stage, the Dashboard lists recent news articles using the search terms "cyber security OR computer spam OR cyber" in Google News 31 . The Dashboard displays the up-to-date news story snippets at the bottom of the user interface page, with hyperlinks that allow the user to open the full story in a new window or tab on their browser. 
Current Status of Data Dashboard Prototype
The current status as of August 7, 2009, includes a working prototype of the Dashboard. The database has some gaps in cross-time or cross-national CERT coverage. In the next phase, more extensive types of data and better sources of data are being sought. 
Challenges
A number of challenges and opportunities for discovery and improvement remain for the Cybersecurity Dashboard project.
Data Availability
The availability of data varies by category, but is often limited or nonexistent. In particular, the cybersecurity category of data is particularly difficult to find. CERTs are the primary source of such data, but many countries do not have national CERTs, and many national CERTs do not provide much data, if any at all. The lack of data availability will continue to be a pressing challenge for the ECIR Dashboard project.
Data Consistency & Reliability
Among CERTs that have data available for nation-level threats and vulnerabilities, consistency is a serious problem. Many of the CERTs that have such data have only begun recording data within the past three or four years; this makes historical trend analysis limited in utility. Furthermore, a lack of consistency between CERTs makes the deployment of a single framework for comparison of cybersecurity data difficult. CERTs often do not share similar reporting styles (some report in absolute numbers; some report in percentages only); they often do not share categorization methods for threats/vulnerabilities (identifying different groups into which threats/vulnerabilities fall differs between almost every CERT). There are some very general categories that can be constructed successfully, but they are uncommon. Data consistency and reliability issues will continue to pose a challenge for the ECIR Dashboard project and will be a major focus of our future activities.
to mis-represent data than other sources might. 
